Is REDD really “green”, or are we just colour-blind?

Is REDD really “green”, or are we just colour-blind?

REDD stands for Reducing Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation, and is set to come into force in 2012. The concept was first introduced at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP11) in December 2005 by the governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica. The aim is to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide realised from the destruction of the world’s forests, which amounted to approximately 20% of annual global emissions in the 1990s (IPCC 2009). More recently, the REDD+ scheme has been introduced, to reward countries for the conservation of standing stocks of carbon, forest restoration and reforestation (see underlined text below). REDD+ rewards countries that have preserved their carbon stocks by giving money to High Forest, Low Deforestation (HFLD) countries. It stems from article 1 b) (iii) of the Bali Action Plan (2007), which states that there should be enhanced consideration of:

“Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.”

REDD+ has received a great deal of international attention, and the forest negotiation track at Copenhagen was one of the most successful. However, this promising piece of policy has a number of problems that undermine its environmental integrity.

Additionality and Leakage are two ugly beasts that raise their heads when the green virtue of REDD is discussed. The problem of additionality refers to the risk that payments will go to areas that were not threatened by deforestation, i.e. additional forest protection will not be achieved. One solution suggested is the use of Global Regional Averages of deforestation; records that can be used to assess the additional benefit from investment in certain areas. The term leakage is being replaced by displacement, which more accurately describes the problem; preventing forest loss in one area may displace logging to a previously unthreatened site. If this occurs, there will be no net reduction in deforestation. It has been suggested that forest loss should be monitored at a national level to overcome this problem. However, this will not prevent ‘international leakage’ where loggers move out of one country and into another with fewer regulations.

Integral to these issues are the challenges of monitoring, making changes in deforestation Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable (MRV) and establishing appropriate reference levels for deforestation. Without the ability to determine relative changes in deforestation, REDD+ will fail to have a positive environmental impact. The resources and expertise available to monitor deforestation varies greatly between countries, although with sufficient investment it would be possible to establish effective remote-sensing techniques. Brazil, for example has an effective system run by the National Space Research Institute (EDF 2009). The bigger challenges involve establishing consistent methods that are comparable across the globe, and whether monitoring organisations should be internal or external to any particular state. This last issue is particularly politically sensitive; even though independent monitoring is theoretically preferable, no country likes the idea of being spied on. The different reference levels being discussed can also be pretty controversial. The big debate is over the use of historical rates of deforestation or a projection of likely deforestation given the developmental status of a country. The socio-economic assumptions integral to the latter option, and the lack of data for much of the world, mean that it could end up being little more than sophisticated guesswork.

Another issue that will affect the effectiveness of REDD+ is the scope of the scheme. This refers to the breath of focus that REDD+ will take, and which aspects should be prioritised. Even if the primary focus is carbon, decisions need to made about the importance of rewards for changes in deforestation, forest degradation, reforestation or forest enhancement. There is also a concern that we should look beyond the carbon paradigm and that other ‘co-benefits’ are considered, including biodiversity , ecosystem services, land rights and poverty alleviation. Tackling these problems will be critical to the success of REDD+. A forest will not survive without the ecosystem functions supported by biodiversity, and the defined access rights dependent on land tenure. Safeguards are needed to ensure that these essential issues are addressed. However, trying to make REDD+ a panacea for all the world’s problems will surely make it weaker.

The financing of REDD+ is the one of the trickiest problems to resolve. It remains unclear exactly where the money will come from, how payments will be calculated, and who the recipients will be. At Copenhagen, it was announced that a total of $3.5 billion would be given by 6 countries. However, this falls far short of the estimate that $6 billion will be needed for 2010 – 2012, made by the Informal Working Group on Interim Finance for REDD. It is also unclear whether this money is additional, or redirected from other environmental and aid projects. The debate also continues over the efficacy of different payment mechanisms. A stocks approach to financing could be a much better approach than the flows approach currently being advocated. The ‘stocks’ approach would focus on paying countries for the quantity of trees they have standing, and would get around the challenges associated with calculating deforestation rates and reference levels. Payments would be made from a global fund, with contributions made by each country based on the per capita GDP. The system would therefore benefit the poorest countries the most, giving the countries with the highest opportunity cost the greatest reward for protecting their forests. However, the equitable distribution of funds within each country will require strategies for dealing with corruption and improvements in forest governance.

There clearly remain many unsolved problems that affect the positive impact that REDD+ might have. REDD+ is still an immature piece of policy and many countries lack the infrastructure and political willpower to make it a success. However, there are many potential solutions to the issues discussed above and progress is still being made at an international level. The continuing negotiations over the next few months and years will determine exactly how "green" REDD+ can be.

Thanks to everyone involved in the REDD policy workshop that brought up these issues, and specifically to Wouter Langhout for ace inspiration for the title and Tim Hodgetts for introducing us to the idea that we should just count trees and pay people for them. -Claudia Gray.

References

IPCC (2009). Fact sheet: Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action. Read this!.

Bali Action Plan (2007). Read this!

Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) (2009). Brazil national and state REDD report. Read this!

Parks for the Protection of the Interests of Multinationals: Beware the Bioprospecting Monster

As some of you might know already, although the benefits of the CBD for biodiversity remain to be seen, Article 8(j) from the CBD has been celebrated by indigenous people all over the world. It obliges the contracting parties, (of course, as far as possible and as appropriate), to “…respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge innovations and practices”.

However, the potential benefits for the indigenous people depend on the strength of the CBD in respect to competing interests and treaties. The CBD has been notoriously in conflict with TRIPS, the Treaty on Intellectual Property Rights. TRIPS allows the patenting of plants and animals, and provides a strong protection for patent holder, something that can be seen as directly opposed to the concerns of the CBD expressed in the article above.

In their 2003 article, Ullrich Brand and Chris Görg analyze the CBD and TRIPS, with special attention to the biodiversity politics in Mexico. The authors, writing from a post-fordist viewpoint (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-Fordism), put the tensions over Mexico’s genetic diversity in a global context. They argue that the state, as a consequence of competition between states rich in biodiversity, should do everything to facilitate the exploitation of its genetic resource by western industrial companies (pharma, agro, chemical). This view is endorsed by Conservation NGO’s, which are more than happy with the extra funding this could provide. However, within Mexican politics this has led to resistance by indigenous groups, who fear expropriation from their own genetic resources, of which they are the legal owners according to the CBD (art. 3). In fact, in 1999, just that happened – the state began limiting access of indigenous peoples to the Chiapas Lancandon Rainforest, claiming that people in this area would destroy nature. This left the region open to bioprospecting, or the collection of genetic material. There are other examples, some involving local actors, others industry and/or NGOs.

In this context, Brand and Görg offer two solutions for this conflict: (1) a “soft” solution, taking into account indigenous knowledge, and utilizing it while bioprospecting. This method allows local actors to become involved in, and partly control, the decisions that are made. This method may influence competition between states, but the authors argue that competition between local actors may also be encouraged; (2) A “hard” solution, primarily concerned with collecting the genetic material, and not with the knowledge that might be associated with it. This may involve the creation of National parks, which then transfer the property rights to the state, opening the way for bioprospecting by western consumers and expropriating local people from their homes.

We see this as yet another monstrosity spawned by globalization. Parks created for this purpose have nothing to do with the conservation of biodiversity, and could result in misleading figures about the conservation in biodiversity some countries. Furthermore, this could hamper the efforts of conservationists around the globe to find solutions to the conflicts between indigenous people and national parks.

Beware the Bioprospecting monster!

- Wouter Langhout and Emma Burnett